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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a-2(j) of the Utah Code
Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT?
Standard of Review:
Under Rule 56 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment is appropriate whenever "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). As an appellate court
reviewing a summary judgment, [this Court applies] the same standard as that
applied by the trial court. That is, "[this Court] considers the evidence in the light
most favorable to the losing party, and affirm[s] only where it appears there is no
genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact, or where, even according to the
facts as contended by the losing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law." Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather
than fact, this Court is of course free to reappraise the trial court's legal
conclusions.
Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 751 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah App. 1988) (Citations omitted).
B. DID THE APPELLANT FAIL TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE?
Rule 24 (a)(9) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a party challenging a
finding of fact must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding.
Aspenwood, L L. C. v. C A. T., L. L. C, 73 P.3d 947, 956 (Utah App. 2003).
Plaintiffs Memorandum Opposing Asher's Motion For Summary Judgment (R. 128)
references depositions and evidence of record which raised genuine issues of fact supporting the
trial court's conclusion that: "The Court concludes that the matters presented to the Court in
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connection with the motion include genuine issues of material fact regarding the acts and
capacity of the named defendants and their individual liabilities for alleged fraudulent
misrepresentations." (R. 143).
C. DID APPELLANTS FAIL TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF
THEIR POST-TRIAL MOTIONS?
The decision in Hansen v. Stewart, 16\ P.2d 14,17 (Utah 1988) states the rules as
follows:
[9] On appeal, however, when a challenge is made to a trial court's denial
of a motion for a j.n.o.v. or a new trial and the challenge is based on a claim that
there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict, the different standards
governing the trial court in passing on these motions become immaterial because
of the differing degrees of discretion we accord trial courts in ruling on these
motions. A trial court has some discretion in deciding whether or not to grant a
new trial, and we reverse only when that discretion is abused. A trial court has no
latitude in passing on a motion for a j.n.o.v.; its decision must be correct.
Therefore, an insufficiency-of-the-evidence based challenge to a denial of either
motion is governed by one standard of review: we reverse only if, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed, we conclude a tat
the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Because the Hansens'
challenge to the denial of their motions amounts to an attack on the sufficiency of
the evidence, they "must marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict" and tli ^A
show that the evidence cannot support the verdict.
(citations omitted) (R. 347).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
On October 28, 2003, Appellee, Sharree Rodgers (Sharree) contracted to buy the house
situated in the hills of North Salt Lake adjoining a golf course pursuant to a Real Estate Purchase
Contract (REPC), which included a Seller's Property Condition Disclosure dated 10-20-03.
Sharree's claims against the Appellants are based upon breaches of express warranties of
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contract and fraudulent misrepresentations relating to moisture conditions of the house.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Herein, Appellee states facts which appellant should have included in compliance with
the requirement of marshalling the evidence. Where facts are included in the transcript, the
reference will be (Tr.

).

We begin with the testimony of Sharree in Volume I page 1 and following, however
concentrating on the disputed issues relating to moisture.
Sharree was looking for a house to buy and saw a "For Sale" sign with the telephone
number of Nathan Hale (Hale), the listing realtor, who arranged for a walk through inspection of
the house (Tr. 3).
Hale provided the UPRC form and filled in the information relative to the offer from
discussion with Sharree and she signed the offer (Tr. 8) on October 28, 2003 (Tr. 11). The offar
was accepted the same date. The Property Disclosure signed by Melanie Asher (Melanie) is
dated October 20, 2003, and was delivered to Sharree by Hale (Tr. 11). The Sellers Disclosure
requires an answer of "yes" or "no" with blocks to be checked with respect to conditions of the
property and Sharree looked closely wherever there would be a "yes" answer such as were
answered "yes" in paragraph 13E and 13F, and because there was not sufficient information she
sent the disclosure back and Floyd supplied two handwritten insertions in paragraph 13 (Tr. 13).
Sharree was very concerned about disclosures in paragraph 17, "OTHER MOISTURE
CONDITIONS," because her employment caused her to be away from home extensively an she
had experienced water problems in her previous home, and she noted that all subparagraphs of 17
were answered "No." Subsequently, at the house inspection, Floyd Asher insisted on being
3

present (Tr. 15) and she asked Mr. Asher at least three times if he ever had water in the house
and his answer was "no, don't worry Sharree, I've not had a drop of water in that house." (Tr.
16).
The major flooding occurred in the east bedroom of the basement, and Sharree had seen a
picture of the furnishings and carpet in that room as it looked at the time of her inspection (Tr.
18) and the bedroom picture was Plaintiff Exhibit P-9.
Closing on the sale of the house was on December 8,2003, at which time she paid the
purchase price of $760,000.
The first flooding occurred on February 21, 2004, about one month after occupying the
house and Sharree discovered a "mushy" carpet in the bedroom, Exhibit 9. (Tr. 23). She and her
brother obtained a shop vac to siphon a tank full on this occasion. About one week later,
February 26, the water had "expanded" into the entire bedroom (Tr. 25) as well as into an
adjoining storage room and furnace room creating a big pool of water. Upon removing the
carpet, they noticed a big piece of red padding attached to the black pad with duct tape. They
vacuumed the water, filling eight tanks of 12 gallons each (Tr. 26) and together with other areas
vacuumed about 100 gallons between the bedroom furnace room and storage room (Tr. 27).
During the extraction process they took pictures and videotape which were shown to the jury and
which showed the red pad attached to the black carpet pad, cracks in the padding and in the floor
(Tr. 28).
The flooding continued all day long (Tr. 31). The furnace room had been newly painted
and there was a glued-down carpet which Sharree concluded was to conceal previous flooding
(Tr. 32-34).
4

The extraction continued through February 27, for another 150 gallons of water. Sharree
called the builder, Tom Durant and left a message. She also called Floyd Asher (Tr. 35). The
following weekend, Tom Durant called back on March 1st and came to the house. When Tom
came to the basement bedroom, Sharree asked Tom if Asher ever had water in this room. Tom
replied, "Didn't he tell you I helped him clean up a water issue here a year and a half ago." Tom
explained that they had replaced the pad and that was like the red pad shown in the video. They
built the window well up and did some painting. (Tr 36). Tom had memories of Mr. Asher
standing in a pool of water. Tom offered to put temporary drainage pipes near the down spouts
for Sharree, which he did. (Tr. 37).
Sharree was testifying from notes she made concurrently with problems she was facing,
which notes she called a "home log" which started when the water problems began (Tr 16). She
continued to testify referring to her home log, saying that back around February 27, 2003, she
contacted Mr. Asher and asked if he had water in the house to which he answered, "No." Sharree
then told him she was having a flooding problem and asked what he was going to do about it.
Asher replied: "Fm not going to do anything about it." She responded that Asher had
conveniently sealed white and had the carpet glued to conceal to conceal any problem. Sharree
then told him that she would like for him to buy the house back because she was not yet fully
moved into the house and would forego damages. Asher said he couldn't buy the house back,
that he never had water in the house, and that Sharree should contact her home insurance. (Tr.
38). Then when Tom came later and told her of Asher's previous water problem, Sharree again
called Asher and told him she now has evidence that he had water in the house, but she didn't tell
him who had informed her and again told him to buy the house back immediately to which he
5

responded he could not buy the house back because he was going bankrupt. She testified that she
didn't believe his bankruptcy statement because during the negotiations for purchase, Asher said
he was building a new house further up the hill which would be modeled after the house she
bought from him. (Tr. 39).
Sharree then contacted Nathan Hale, the listing realtor with Pro Brokers. Since this
testimony is important to detail, we set it forth in verbatim:
So after I contacted the Ashers, I then contacted Nathan Hale and this is
what Nathan had said, so I spoke with Nathan Hale of Pro Brokers, the real estate
agent who told me that Mr. Asher had called him and stated that he had never had
water in the basement. I told Nathan about Tom's experience in helping Ashers
with the water incident. Nathan contacted the Ashers and they still claimed, he
still claimed he didn't have any water. This is after I told Nathan about what Tom
had told me. And then Nathan said to him, you should consider that there were
others who witnessed the original water problem, then Mr. Asher confessed and
said, we did have water after a big rain storm. Nathan confirmed you did have
water in the basement? And Asher responded with, there was a little.
(Tr. 40).
Thereafter, Asher refused to accept her phone calls and responded by letter. Tom
recommended that she contact Scott Cox, an excavator (Tr. 41) who submitted a bid to create a
"French drain," directing water away from the house (Tr. 42). Sharree indicated to Asher that if
he would cover the damages, she would not take him to court (Tr. 43). Asher responded by letter
dated May 13, 2004, Exhibit 4A, which was read by her to the jury, wherein he was speculating
about the problem and the solution, and suggested having Roto-Rooter examine the drainage
hose and check the sprinkling system.
The Rescue Rooter came to the house, inserted a video camera in the line and discovered
that the drain went a different direction than they thought, going north instead of south (Tr. 48),
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and since it did not pass in front of the central bedroom, it did not cause the flood. (Tr. 49).
Again, on May 28,2004, another flooding occurred into the bedroom and storage room
(Tr. 50), through cracks, and this was depicted on a video shown to the jury. (Tr. 52).
On June 10, 2004, another flooding occurred in which Sharree extracted 60 gallons of
water (Tr. 56. Sharree left a message to Asher that she was proceeding with the French drain
and expected him to pay for it.
Work began on June 17, 2007 for the French drain and suit was commenced against
Ashers, July 6, 2004. During the excavation for the French drain, Sharree testified that no water
appeared to be coming down the wall, and appeared to come between the seam of the wall and
the floor (Tr. 71).
Sharree testified that she had read Floyd's deposition where he said his wife discovered
the water in the bedroom when walking on a mushy carpet in April 2003 (Tr. 72).
Scott Cox
Scott Cox testified that he is engaged in excavation, rock retaining, drains such as French
drains and demolition (Tr. Volume II165). Cox explained what a French drain consists of (Tr.
166). Cox had seen the water problems in the house about two months before constructing the
drain which began June 17, 2004 (Tr. 167). A video of Cox's work was shown to the jury with
Cox describing what was being seen (Tr. 175). Cox excavated along the east (front) of the house
to a depth of about two feet below the footings (Tr. 178). In one area the trench is 14 feet deep
(Tr. 180). A drain pipe was placed in the excavation and backfilled. The grading was arranged
to cause surface flow to go away from the house (Tr. 182) and the front of the house was relandscaped (Tr. 183). Cox's bid of $28,000.00 was paid (Tr. 185). Certain extras were paid by
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Sharree for $1,560.00 (Tr. 186).
Cox also provided a bid January 9, 2006 to Sharree for work which would deal with a
water problem on the north side of the house (Tr. 187) and explained the proposed work (Tr.
189-191). In September 2006, Cox inspected the north side and noted water in that area.
Mr. Garrett cross-examined Cox for details (Tr. 196-218). Cox on redirect examination
testified that the work he performed was necessary to do a good job and was not for the guarantee
(Tr. 229).
Ronald Marshall
Ronald Marshall, a licensed real estate broker since May 1980, has engaged in real estate
in South Davis County (Tr. 238) and has developed several subdivisions (Tr. 39). Marshall
testified concerning the Seller Disclosure part of sales contracts and that a notation of moisture
affects the market price. (Tr. 243). Marshall's opinion was that a reasonable purchaser oi oay^i
and/or broker would make a request to make an offering price of approximately six to seven
percent less than the purchase price plus ask the seller to in fact fix the problem if there had been
a full disclosure of the water problem. (Tr. 258).
Nathan Hale
Ashers called Nathan Hale as their first witness. Hale had been a real estate agent for 26
years. (Tr. 269). In the fall of 2003, Hale visited the subject house, observed no water or smell
of water. (Tr. 271). A few days after the property was listed for sale he showed Sharree the
house two or three times over a two week period. (Tr. 274). A slight separation in a baseboard
in the bedroom was noticed by Sharree who inquired whether the baseboard had been repainted.
Floyd answered there had been a time when a small amount of water which Hale recalled was
8

like a "thimble, I mean a very small amount of water had come through that window" and
slightly discolored the wall and that Asher as "a meticulous individual would paint anything,
correct anything that was slightly off." (Tr. 278).
Upon cross examination, Hale said that Asher indicated there had been sprinkler in the
front yard that malfunctioned resulting in water coming into the window well and a little (Tr.
282) bit of that had seeped through the window and down the wall. Asher did not tell Hale that
he had to pull back the carpet and replace the pad (Tr. 283). Hale identified the picture and
when asked, "Were you present at any time when Mr. Asher indicated there had never been any
water in the house?" he answered, "Yes." (Tr. 285).
The last question to Hale on cross-examination was: "Q. There is one other question.
Ms. Rodgers testified that when she called you after she had the water damage and that you
called Mr. Asher and he denied that there had been any water in the house. It is true that you
told her that he responded that way? A. That's correct." (Tr. 290).
A juror provided a written question to be answered by Hale: "Is it your understanding, is
it legal for Mr. Asher to fill out the form and let his wife sign the disclosure or is it required that
the person filling out the disclosure sign it?" (Tr. 291).
Hale answered: "I don't know the legalities of that. I fill out forms for my wife and she
has confidence and trust in me and she completes those." (Tr. 291).
Floyd Asher
Floyd Asher was sworn (Tr. 293). He began to testify about his acquisition of the lot, the
dealings with Tom Durant in construction when they discussed drainage and possible use of a
French drain and concluded none was needed. Ashers moved into the house December 15,
9

2000, and the only time he experienced water in the house was when he thought water came in
through a window well. (Tr. 322). Tom brought fans over for a day to dry everything out. (Tr.
325). Tom's carpet layer repadded one-third of the room. (Tr. 326).
Asher identified a Special Warranty Deed, Exhibit 11, from Melanie Asher, Trustee of
the Melanie Asher Trust, to Asher Homestead, L.L.C. (Tr. 336) dated September 9, 2002, but not
recorded until October 17, 2003. The delay of recording over one year later was because the
document was in the trust attorney's hands and he failed to send it for recording without any
knowledge of Asher (Tr. 337). We note that the recording date of October 17, 2003 is three days
before the Seller's disclosure date of October 20, 2003 and 11 days before Sharree offered to
purchase on October 28, 2003.
After recess, Asher was recalled to testify (Vol. Ill Tr. 348) and clarified that the vvatcr he
noticed in the bedroom was in April 2002, not 2003. He had built the house at the top of the
peak of the street so water would run in both directions away from the house and he said the
water which came into the house would be "rain or sprinkling system." (Tr. 359). Asher
acknowledged that in his deposition, January 10, 2005, he testified that his water was
encountered in April 2003, but he said the true date would be April 2002 (Tr. 366). He carpeiei
the fruit room-storage room in June 2004, although in his deposition he stated that the carpeting
was done June 2003 (Tr. 371). Floyd said that with regard to the Seller's Disclosure, he and his
wife went over them together but that he entered the markings for "yes" or "no." (Tr. 374).
The question as to which of the Ashers owned the lot at any time was discussed through
pages Tr. 388-395. Asher finally acknowledged that by deed to Asher Homestead L.L.C. dated
September 9, 2002, that entity became the owner so that when Melanie signed the documents in
10

October 2003, she was not the owner of record as trustee or otherwise (Tr. 393). When asked,
"Is there any other persons that can control what happens to the title of this property other than
you or your wife?" he answered, "No." When again asked about the September 9, 2002 deed to
the L.L.C: "And on that date, is it true that Asher Homestead Limited became the owner?" he
answered, "That is probably true." (Tr. 393).
The building permit was taken in the name of Floyd Asher as owner (Tr. 394).
The chain of title to the property was raised again (Tr. 404) and Exhibit 50 was admitted
without objection and is reproduced as follows:
Chain of Title
Lot 815
1. Special Warranty Deed Eaglewood Development L.L.C. to R. Floyd Asher and Melanie S.
Asher 3-17-2000
2. Floyd and Melanie Asher Quit Claim Deed to Melanie Ruth Asher, Trustee 1-31-2001
3. Melanie Ruth Asher Quit Claim Deed to R. Floyd Asher and Melanie R. Asher 7-30-2001
4. Floyd and Melanie Asher Quit Claim Deed to Melanie Ruth Asher, Trustee 7-30-2001
5. Melanie Ruth Asher, Trustee, Warranty Deed to Floyd and Melanie R. Asher 9-23-2002
6. Floyd and Melanie Asher to Melanie R. Asher, Trustee et al. 9-23-20002
7. Melanie Ruth Asher, Trustee et al Special Warranty Deed to Asher Homestead L.L.C, Deed
dated 9-9-2002, recorded 20-17-2003
8. Asher Homestead L.L.C. to Sharree Rodgers dated 12-5-2003, recorded 12-09-2003
A juror presented a written question to be answered by Floyd Asher: "Another question is, after
water came through the window sill, did you paint the interior wall below the window? The Witness:
No it wasn't necessary, nothing.. . ." (Tr. 406).
Floyd Asher's answer is in direct conflict with the testimony of Nathan Hale (Tr. 277):
A
I had inquired as to any thoughts here, has this room been repainted, this area been
repainted, anything happen here, something to that effect.
Q

And what did he say?
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A
He said, yes, that there had been a time when a small amount of water - and I
remember being, for some reason in my mind it was like a thimble, I mean a very small
amount of water had come through that window, hadn't really even moistened the carpet
but it had come through the window and it had slightly discolored the wall.
(Tr. 278).
Melanie Asher testified on direct examination (Tr. 479) and upon cross examination (Tr. 492).
She had no contemporaneous notes to fix the time of whether water came into the house in 2002 or 2003
(Tr. 492). Melanie acknowledged that Tom Durant came and removed all furniture from the bedroom,
pulled back the carpet about one-third of the way through the bedroom (Tr. 493), and that the fans were
running for a few days (Tr. 494). The next question and answer were:
Q
When this first happened whether it happened in 2002 or 2003, you were concerned
enough that you brought Tom Durant over there and required him to do some corrections?
A
He was our contractor and we relied on him. We didn't know where the water came
from. I thought we found out it was from our sprinkling system. (Tr. 495).
When later asked whether she testified that it was raining and that's where the water came from, ;, o
answered: "No, you asked me about the weather conditions and if it was rainy. I said yes but I didn't s;>)
the water was from rain in the window well. It was from our sprinkling system." She said that the
sprinkler is a sprayer, not a rainbird, and was spraying east away from the house (Tr. 497), but it was
spraying the wrong way (Tr. 498).
Melanie was asked about painting and she said, "No, we didn't paint it." (Tr. 502).
When confronted by the deposition of Floyd, where he said that he did not find that the sprinkler
had been knocked or turned around, Melanie said she had not called this to her husband's attention. (Tr.
505).
Tom Durant
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Ashers called Tom Durant as a witness (Tr. 507). He said that when Floyd Asher
called him about the water problem, whether in 2002 or 2003, he went to the home and
investigated, and when asked what he found, he said:
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A

I found there was water in that central room in the lower level.
That would be the bedroom?
Yes, sir.
Could you see it?
Yes, I could.
You could see the water?
Yes.

(Tr. 516). Tom then said the carpet was pulled up in less than half of the room (Tr. 518).
Tom said that the water was coming from surface drainage (Tr. 520) and that the slope of
landscaping was incorrect (Tr. 521).
Tom said that neither Floyd nor Melanie ever mentioned a sprinkler malfunction
as being the source of water (Tr. 531). Tom said that the retention of the window well
has an open bottom and that if water entered the window well, it would have to soak
down through one foot of gravel and 48 inches of clay before coming up under the floor
into the crack (Tr. 534).
Regarding the extent of water encroachment at the time, Ashers called Tom
concerning the flooding of the basement bedroom. Tom described to the jury that he saw
water on the concrete floor once the carpet and pad were pulled up; Floyd and Melanie
were both there. He testified:
We cut the pad out and in getting the pad out of the room we pushed it up through
the window well and then I put it into my truck. It was heavy. A dry pad would
have been light and it was wet enough that water would drip out of the pad and it
was heavy and left behind noticeable water on the concrete floor.

13

(Tr. 565).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Sharree's Amended Complaint against Ashers alleged that she contracted to
purchase a house owned and occupied by them for $760,000.
The offer to purchase was accepted by the Seller on October 28, 2003, signed by
Melanie Asher individually without any representative capacity written by her together
with her name. A typewritten name, "Melanie Asher, Trustee" appears below her
signature, however the name and date of the trust are not mentioned in the contract
documents. Paragraph 13 o f the contract warrants her authority to bind the Seller if the
Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust estate, limited liability company or other entity.
The chain of title exhibit shows Ashers individually acquired the lot March 17,
2000 and thereafter made five conveyances between and among them anu a irust nutu
September 9, 2002, when a deed from Melanie as trustee to Asher Homestead L.L.C., a
Nevada limited liability company was executed but not recorded until October 17, 2003,
by an attorney who they claim recorded on that date without their knowledge. Thus, on
October 28, 2003, Melanie was not an owner of record as Trustee. The conveyance to
Sharree on December 9, 2003 was by the L.L.C., which had never appeared in any
contract documents. The L.L.C. had no other assets, and the net receipt at closing
$298,576.14 was used by Ashers to buy another lot upon which they constructed a
dwelling they lived in at the time of trial.
A "Sellers Property Condition Disclosure" dated October 20, 2003 names the
Seller as "Floyd and Melanie Asher" and is signed by Melanie Asher. No other printing
14

could control what happens to the title to the lot. (Tr. 382).
The Judgment on Jury Verdict recited the Special Verdict that I lo) d Asher and
Mela i

tract between them and the plaintiff; that they fraudulently

concealed or fraudulently failed to disclose a material fact to Sharree Rodgers; that they
committed fraud against Shai ree and a reasonable amoi iiit of damages is $52,050.00.
The jury was instructed upon the elements and factors of the doctrine of Alter
Ego, and implicit in the verdict is that irrespective of any record title, the persons, Floyd
ami fvlflanie ami oilier nihlies were one and Ihe same

Appellants claim in their brief,

that a trust was the proper party, fails not only under the Alter Ego doctrine, biit also
because of the absence of aha

ntati\ e capacity ai 1 :i no i lan ling of a trust

or date of trust binding the individual. 1 io> J is bound on the contract where he
personally wrote the items of disclosure and directed Melanie to sign. Floyd is also
liable iml hill1, I in* eontt'ji lual hvaehes nl < nnliat I and uairauliri hut also lor (VainI as
found by the jury.
The Appellants failed to n larshal tl le abi n idant e\ idei ice or bread l of ecu lti act,
breach of warranties and fraudulent representations.
Floyd on at least three occasions assured Sharree that there had never been a drop
i

. .. .

/urant,

the contractor who built the house informed Sharree that Ashers had previously
experienced flooding in the hoi ise which iiivolved removing tl: i.e soaked, drippii ig carpet
pad from one-third of a finished basement bedroom.
15

Appellants have failed to marshal the evidence in support of any of the points in
the Argument.
Sharree's Statement of Facts shows an abundance of evidence in support of the
Judgment on the Verdict.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL
RECORD EVIDENCE.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24 (a)(9) provides in part: "A party
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding."
Ashers have not marshaled the evidence, and particularly the evidence set forth in
Sharree's Statement of Facts herein which support the Special Verdict of the jury and the
Judgment On Jury Verdict.
The jury returned a Special Verdict as follows:
1. The defendants, Floyd and Melanie Asher, breached a contract between tjiem
and the plaintiff.
2. Floyd Asher and Melanie Asher fraudulently concealed or fraudulently failed
to disclose a material fact to Sharree Rodgers.
3. Floyd Asher and Melanie Asher committed fraud against Sharree Rodgers.
4. The reasonable amount of damages to fairly compensate Sharree Rodgers for
the conduct described in 1, 2, and 3 above is the sum of $52,050.00.

See Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988) cited herein, supra 2; Hatch v. Davis,
102 P.3d 774, 778 (Utah App. 2004).
Appellants in Point II pages 15 through 18, make general statements about a small
amount of water getting into the house. As reviewed in the Statement of Facts herein
16

most o f which supports the verdict.
Appellants' brief, page 17, states that the most telling evidence was given by
Nathan Hale, the realtor who collected o \ er $30,000 in sales commissions from Asher for
this sale. We n o w show the deficiencies in Hale's testimony and its conflict even with
T.

Hale's testimony is summarized herein on page 8, where he is shown to have
testified that he had asked Floyd if the room had been repainted in this area.

Hales

testified that I 'lo> el's ai lswer w as "'yes," tl lat there had. been a time when a small aiiioi tut
of water "and I remember being, for some reason in my mind it was like a thimble, I
mean a v .

,_ .

•

moistened the carpet.. . .

e tl ironj

y

(ir. z i /).

Whereas, Floyd testified in response to a j u r o r ' s written question as to whether

necessary, nothing.

" Floyd testified that the water he encountered was discovered

when his wife was walking bau: looted ou (he "mush)' e a q x l , M d a n i e also lestihed llllial
" N o , we d i d n ' t paint it," when asked about the painting. (Tr. 502).
Hale was in the courtroom, when. Sharree testi.fi.ed. from her h o m e log that she
called. 1 lale to it i.qi lii e aboi it ki lowledge of watei problen is ii i tl le 1 LOI ise, I lale was asked
on cross examination:
Q
I here is one other question. M s . Rodgers testified that when she called
you after she had the water damage and that you called Mr. Asher and he denied
that there had been any water in the house. Is it true that you told her that he
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responded that way?
A

That's correct.

(Tr. 290). Hale's testimony was contradicted by Floyd and Melanie Asher, and by
Sharree's testimony from her home log.
POINT II.

PLAINTIFF TESTIFIED FROM HER
CONTEMPORANEOUS NOTES, AND IT WAS PROPER
FOR HER COUNSEL TO READ TO THE JURY THE SAME
NOTES.
Appellants' Point V is that the court erred in allowing plaintiffs counsel to read
her notes to the jury. Plaintiffs counsel in addressing the jury said:
There is some testimony of Ms. Rodgers that was never refuted by Mr.
Hale or anybody; after she found out from Tom Durant that there had been a
flooding problem before she'd called up Mr. Hale, her notes here say, "Sharree
confronts Mr. Asher Mr. Garrettt: Your honor please. I don't believe this was in evidence and I object
to it.
The Court: Is it - the point is whether or not - the notes aren't in evidence but you
are saying this was the testimony that she gave?
Mr. Fadel: This was the testimony that she gave in the reading of those notes,
Your Honor.
The Court: Overruled.
(Tr. 609-610). Mr. Garrett did not raise the objection of hearsay, and is raising it for the
first time on appeal.
In previous filings with the trial court, Mr. Garrett contended that he had no
opportunity to cross-examine or review the notes. (R. 363).
On direct examination Sharree testified:
A

So we closed on the sale that was shortly after that. I kept a home log after
18

I w as ha v ing problems.
Q
You're reading from notes you made. Did you make those notes
concurrently with the problems you were facing or are you using those notes to
refresh your recollection?
A

I am. I hese notes - 1 had a home log, w hat I called the home log w hen I

started to have water, I started to keep notes.
No objection was raised to her reading from the home log because other counsel received
copies of the hoi tie log at the time of a pre\ ioi is deposition of Sharree taken b> Aslier.
Thus, the home log read to the jury by plaintiffs counsel was substantially
identical to he t: testimonj from those notes.
Mr. Hale testified after Sharree had testified and Hale testified that her testimony
on this issue was correct.
POINT III

I HE I RIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED ASHERS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

Ashers asserted that the basis for their motion for summary judgment is that they
did i IC t personally sign the coi itract ai id that \ lelanie A si ler signed in a representative
capacity as Trustee of the Melanie Asher Trust, which was not named as a party. I he
"Melanie .\ .

-..

; p.. •« : , n*. .

The Real Estate Purchase Contract b

; is.
i\ L v on each of the pages

up to the Addendum, all dated October 28, 2003. The Addendum No. One, Acceptance
of Offi :i is sigi ie< I "Melanie Asher" 10-28-2003 \ is Seller.
The Seller's Property Condition Disclosure on the first page shows " S E L L E R
n a m e Floyd and IV lelai lie i '"Vshe r (Seller) " Each page contaii is Seller 's It ii.ti.als as "IV I - \ ."
Page 5 o f 5, "Verification By Seller" is signed "Seller Melanie Asher Date 10-20-03."
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The only place a trust is mentioned is on the "Acceptance/Counteroffer Rejection," which
is signed as an acceptance by Melanie Asher as Seller with a typewritten statement under
her signature which reads "Melanie Asher, Trustee." However, no trust is identified. It
does not mention "Melanie Asher Trust," or the date of any Trust.
In the case of DBL Distributing, Inc. v. 1 Cache, L. L. C, 147 P.3d 478 (Utah
App. 2006), this Court recently held that to relieve an individual signer from liability for a
corporate obligation, the signer's corporate capacity must be clear from the form of the
signature. The Court cited Stanley v. Deseret Foods Corp., 98 Utah 577, 74 P.2d 1221,
1223-25 (1938) (affirming action on note against corporate secretary who signed
corporate promissory note without adding word "Secretary" next to signature). The DBL
Court stated further:
[14] This line of cases alone is sufficient to determine that the trial court erred
in dismissing DBL's claim against Gary Bracken, as he signed the 1999
application with a bare signature that did not indicate his corporate capacity.
Bracken argues that the preprinted language of the form—"By:" preceding the
signature line and "Owner/Corporate Officer/Partner/Principal" underneath it—
demonstrates that he signed the document as a corporate officer for 1 Cache and
not as an individual. At most, these circumstances might create a fact question
that would preclude summary judgment against Bracken on this issue. However,
that same fact question must be resolved in favor of DBL for proposes of
reviewing Bracken's motion to dismiss.
DBL Distributing at 481.
This analysis is supported by the holding of the Court of Appeals in the case of
TWN, Inc. V. Michel, 66 P.3d 1031 (Utah App. 2003). In TWN, Inc., one Christenson received a
tax deed in his name as grantee "Richard Christenson" and later conveyed the tract as grantor
identified in the deed as "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee." TWN, Inc., the plaintiff, contended
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tiul (hi: pjanfec n\ thr >trn'l rn r i v d iiolliniy
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Christenson \\<is n^l in in:! u Inisfcn

The

Court reversed summary judgment, which was granted plaintiffs by the trial court, holding that
the word "Trustee" was nevertheless just describing the individual, R ichard Cliristenson, and not
restricting his capacity to that of a trustee apart from being an individual. The Court held:
[2] Although Defendants argue in general terms that the unexplained appearance
fo the word "trustee" creates ambiguity on the face of the deed from Mr.
Christenson to Zions Bank, the thrust of their argument brings them within the
doctrine known as "descriptio personae" This term is defined as "the use of a
word or phrase merely to identify or point out the person intended and not as an
intimation that the language in connection with which it occurs is to apply to him
only in the technical character which might appear to be indicated by the word."
Id at 1033, [21. paragraph 8.
POINT IV.

THE LIABILITY OF FLOYD ASHER IS ESTABLISHED BY
CONTRACT AS WELL AS FRAUDULENT
MISREPRESENTATIONS.

Exhibit 50, Chain of "I itle Lot 8! 5. set forth in the Statement of Facts, on page 11
identifies Floyd Asher as a party to six ii;;.. ent conveyances of Lot 815 between March 17,
2000 and September 23, 2002. I he question as to which of the Ashers owned the lot at any time
was discussed through pages Ti, 388-395. Asher finally acknowledged that by deed to Asher

-signed the documents in October 2003, she was not the owner of record as trustee or otherwise
(1 i 393), W hen asked, "Is there any other persons that can control what happens to the title of
this property other than you or your wife?" he answered, "No." When again asked about the
September 9, 2002 deed, to the I ,.I ,.C: "And on that date, is it true that Asher Homestead Limited
became the o vv iiei ?" he at iswei ed, " 1 1 lat is pi obabl> ti i le " ( I it 393).
Floyd Asher was more involved in this case than Melanie. Floyd personally made the
21

notations of property disclosures and directed Melanie to sign the disclosures, which shows the
Seller as being "Floyd and Melanie Asher." Paragraph 14 of the REPC makes the Seller
Disclosure part of the "entire Contract."
POINT V.

THE VARIOUS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES WERE IN
FACT THE ALTER EGOS OF FLOYD ASHER AND MELANIE
ASHER AND TREATED SIMILARLY AS CORPORATIONS.

The question as to who was the record owner of Lot 815 on the date Melanie
Asher signed the Disclosure, October 20,2003, and when she signed the REPC, October
28, 2003, requires some close scrutiny. If Melanie Asher as Trustee conveyed by Special
Warranty Deed, dated September 9, 2002, to Asher Homestead L.L.C, then that limited
liability company became the owner as between them before that deed was recorded
October 17, 2003 by their attorney. They claimed that their attorney recorded the deed
October 17, 2003 without their knowledge. If this were true, then on the date of the
REPC, October 28, 2003, Melanie Asher should have been signing as a partner of Asher
Homestead L.L.C. and not as Trustee of an undisclosed Trust. However, since no
mention of the limited liability company is made in the contract, her signature then
becomes that of the individual, Melanie Asher, acting for herself and as authorized agent
of Floyd Asher, who was the only other person who had an interest or right of control of
the title to Lot 815.
The chain of title shows as item #8, "Asher Homestead L.L.C. to Sharree Rodgers
dated 12-5-2003 and recorded 12-09-2003." Sharree had no knowledge of any ownership
of that L.L.C. before December 9, 2003. The deed to that L.L.C. was recorded October
17, 2003 without the knowledge of even Floyd and Melanie. Therefore, clearly, Sharree
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h
Appellants' brief that "the evidence in this case demonstrates that Plaintiff elected to do
business with Asher Homestead I .L.C."
Floy cl Asher testified that the A sher I lomestead I I X ha i no assets before the recorded
deed, and after receiving the settlement of $298,576.14 from closing of the sale with plaintiff on
December 9, 2003, the Asher Homestead. I ,1 ,.C. acting through the defendants receh eel the
money with which they acquired another lot for construction of another personal dwelling, the
title to which was taken in the name of still another I ,.I,.C, whereupon Asher Homestead LI C.

corporation to be the alter ego of the defendants, all of which factors were proved.
Appellants cite the case of d'Elia v. Rice Development] .

r.o.

2006). That case also includes an important footnote 5 as follows:
c

In Ditty v. CheckRite, Ltd., 973 F.Supp. 1320 (D.Utah 1997), a federal district court
determined that under Utah law the corporate veil piercing doctrine equally applies to
Utah liability companies. See id. At 1335 (noting that although "there is little case
law discussing veil piercing theories outside the corporate context, most
commentators assume that the doctrine applies to limited liability companies" and
citing a number of commentators).

It

A limited liability company qualifies to be deemed a corporation under the alter ego
doctrine. - ;< ; .Ji statute on Revenue and Taxation § 59 3 101(8) defines "Corporation:"
"'Corporation'" includes: (a) entities defined as corporations under Sections 7701(a) and 7704,
Internal Revenue Code; and (b) other organizations that are taxed as corporations for federal
income tax pi irposes i it idei 1:1 le It iten lal R e\ ei w le Code "
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The 2006 edition of U. S. Master Tax Guide published by CCH Incorporated, paragraph
201 provides in part:
Further, other entities with more than one member are allowed to elect corporate
status on Form 8832, Entity Classification Election. Thus, an entity that is a
partnership under the laws of the state in which it is formed may elect to be taxed
as a C corporation or an S corporation under the Code (Reg. §301.7701-3).
However, an entity organized under a state's corporation statute cannot elect to be
taxed as a partnership. Partnerships that are publicly traded are taxed as
corporations unless 90 percent or more of the gross income consists of qualifying
passive-type income (Code Sec. 7704(c); Reg. §§ 1.7704-1 and 1.7704-3).
Accordingly, all of the limited liability companies which were created by and for Floyd and
Melanie Asher should be deemed their alter ego and be disregarded as owners apart form said
individuals.
POINT VI.

PLAINTIFF CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY PROVED ALL
ELEMENTS OF FRAUD.

The jury was instructed by instruction No. 24 that plaintiff was required lo prove cau. oi
six elements by clear and convincing evidence.
Instruction No. 25 on the claims of either fraudulent concealment or fraudulent disci jsare
there are three elements to be proved by clear and convincing evidence:
1. The nondisclosed information was material; and
2. The nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose; and
3. There is a legal duty to communicate the information.
As to materiality, this Court stated in YAZD v. Woodside Homes Corp., 109 P.3d 393 (Utah App.
2005), that a report would have been material, "as it contained some interest to the Buyers in
making their decision to buy." Id. at 396; (citing Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235 (Utah 2002)
(defining materiality to be something which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence and
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p
made known to Asher on at least three occasions that she wanted assurance of no previous water
problem. The Seller's Property Disclosure clearly instructs the Seller that the buyer will rely on
the disclosi ire foi i n
Ashers clearly had knowledge that the disclosure of no water problems was false, given
thetestimon
of the room, and Asher's testimony that fans operated a few days to dry out the room before
replacing the pad.
T lie legal cli it;; « II: : :oi i 11 :i n n licate the informatioi i Is set fortl i in the INS I VR I JCTIONS TO
SELLER in the Seller's Property Condition Disclosure, and paragraph

the REPC requiring

Seller disclosure.
Therefore plaintiff is entitled to recover on fraud claims under Instruction 25, havirg
clearly and convincingly proved the three elements.
Since there car i be i 10 dm iplicated damages i u idei Iiisti: i ictiol 1 24 and. 25. ,
Sharree contends the six elements of Fraud in Instruction No. 24 w ere proved by clear and
convincing evidence, bi it i ill it lot burdei I the brief v ith fi n ther ai ial> sis of fi ai id elaii ns except by
a short reference to each element.
1.

Floyd made false and misleading statements that he never had a drop of water

con le into tl le 1 101 ise

' I oi i i Di it at it indicated a soaked cai pet pad ii i oi ic half of the room.

2.

Floyd knew the statements were false.

3.

The statei i lei its w ere n latei ial ii i that SI: lai i ee w oi ild i level 1: i.ave purchased tl le

house had she known of the water problem and she even demanded that Floyd buy back

the house.
4.

Floyd made statements intending that Sharree rely upon them to sign the contract.

5.

Sharree reasonably relied upon the false statements since there was no evidence at

the time of her inspections of any noticeable water damage.
6.

As a result of the false statements, Sharree suffered damages in excess of $52,000.

POINT VII. THE DAMAGE AWARD WAS REASONABLE.
The judgment on the verdict was $52,500.00. Sharree had paid Timberline Construction
$28,300 for the French drain plus $1500 in landscaping. She lost $6,600 in wages for time off
work dealing with flooding problems, which was charged against her vacation time. The carpet
damage was estimated at $1500, which was the cost indicated by Floyd. These expenses total
$37,900. Ron Marshall testified that the reputation damage to the home from history of water
damage, if disclosed to a prospective purchaser would be from 5% to 7% discount. 5 /u oi
$750,000 is $37,500.00. Sharree's loss of use of the home for several months and the value of
services by her brother in dealing with the flooding are additional damages the jury could well
have considered in making a conservative award of $52,500.00. No compensation was given for
the months of pain and inconvenience in dealing with a continuous flow of water.
POINT VIII. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS REASONABLE AND
PROPER.
Ashers cite Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992) claiming the case to
be authority for denying attorney's fees in this case.
We first summarize the facts in the Sine case. Cottonwood as Lessor brought action
against Sine to recover possession of premises occupied by the Lessee in the shopping center.
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negotiations which failed and gave rise to the action to recover possession . Sine counterclaimed
to enforce an alleged oral agreement but vacated the premises before trial.

work performed, the amount of attorney time expended, and the hourly billing rate, but attached
t o the affidavit were office ledger sheets of the Lessor showing accounting of costs, fees, and
payments on account, but no mention in Lessors ledger sheets were specific as to the type of
work performed, the time expended or the rate charged. The Supreme Court concluded:

reasonable, the award must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings." Id. at
269 [6].
The Court then turned to decide if Lessor was entitled to attorney's fees for legal work
performed after Sine vacated the premises. The lease provided for three kinds of legal work:
collections of rei it; enforcement of pro\ isions of lease; and seci u: ement of possession of the
premises. Therefore the Lessor was not entitled to fees incurred after Sine vacated.
In effect, the I .essor, upon further proceedings to provide the detailed evidence of work
performed by the attorney related to all except those fees accruing after Sine vacated the
premises, would be allowed such fees as the trial court finds to be reasonable.
Ii it this R odgers \ Ashei case, tl ic A I fidavit it I Si ipport of \;t:tO'i*tie> s I rees is that of tl le
attorney who performed the services. The REPC paragraph 17 provides in pertinent part: "In the
event of litigation or i maing arbitration to enforce ...

'ontract, the prevailing party shall be

entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees." 1his Court in the recent opinion in the case of
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Crowley v. Black, 582 Utah Adv. Rep 6 decided 7-12-07, stated that "a Court should grant
reasonable attorney fees in accordance with a written contractual provision." The court also
stated, "Further, we consider a 'contractual provision allowing attorney fees in connection with
litigation' to include appeals."
"Enforce" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition as: "enforce, vb. 1. To
give force to effect to (a law, etc.); to compel obedience to. 2. Loosely, to compel a person to
pay damages for not complying with (a contract)." Rodgers was litigating to compel Ashers to
pay damages for not complying with the contract. All of the claims related to issues regarding
contractual obligations relative to moisture conditions related to the "Property." Page 1 of the
SPCD shows "Property Address 1131 Eaglewood Loop, North Salt Lake, Utah ("Property").
One of the cases cited in Sine was Graco-Fishing & Rental tools, Inc. v. Ironwood
Exploration, 766 P.2d 1074 (Utah 1999) in which Graco's claim was both under a mechanic
lien statute and a separate bond statute. Graco prevailed under the lien statute but was not
covered by the contractor's bond statute. Fees would be allowed on the successful lien statute
but because the trial court did not rule in its favor on the bond statute, the case was remanded to
the trial court on the issue of attorney fees.
In this Rodgers case, the jury found in favor of Rodgers on all issues presented to them
and they were not considering anything other than moisture condition damages, past and future.
The jury was not instructed to specify each element relating to moisture conditions on the
property. Sharree testified concerning the continued water problem on the north side of the
house (Tr. 68) (Tr. 77). The jury verdict should be interpreted to include some damages for each
element relating to moisture. It was not disputed that even now there is an accumulation of water
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on the property which was not diverted by the constructed French drain. Paragraph 10 of the
Amended Complaint alleges damages for the French drain as constructed at $28,300, and for the
continual flooding on the northerly side of the property costing $25,000. (R.298). Upon cross
examination by Mr. Garrett, Sharree testified that the water problem on the north side would cost
$27,000 to correct (Tr. 154) and that water on the north side was coming into an indoor stairwell.
(Tr. 156).
The defendants agreed to the submission of affidavits to support attorneys fees, which
they received by a mailing, October 2, 2006, and have never requested further information nor a
hearing. The motion of the defendants, including their argument on attorney's fees, was mailed
October 23, 2006, and made no request for hearing or further verification. The defendants are
responsible for the necessity of increased legal services arising from their third-party complaint.
Although the third-party defendant was an amicable adversary, the third-party defendant was
obligated to assist in Ashers' defense to avoid or mitigate liability. The joining of third party also
resulted in a demand for jury trial, further increasing legal services. The fees as stated in the
attorney's affidavit were necessary and reasonable.
CONCLUSION
The failure of Ashers to marshal the evidence should preclude any challenge to the
findings of the jury and those set forth in the judgment on the verdict. Ohline Corp. v. Granite
Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993).
Appellants' claim in the conclusion in their brief, "one of the most glaring errors is
Instruction 26 given to the jury on alter ego." The flip flopping in the chain of title was such that
Floyd and Melanie did not know of the status of record ownership at several particular times.
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The belated conveyance to Asher Homestead, L.L.C., and the false claim of Trust ownership
have been utilized by Ashers as attempts to avoid their individual responsibility is proof that the
alter ego was to perpetuate a fraud. All of the factors and elements stated in Instruction 26 were
those listed by this Court in the case of Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah App. 1987).
Also, as stated in Colman: "For the purposes of appellate review, the trial court's decision to
pierce the corporate veil will be upheld if there is substantial evidence in favor of the judgment."
Furthermore the record and evidence support the jury verdict on the grounds of breach of
contract, breach of warranty, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent failure to disclose and fraud.
The judgment on the verdict should be affirmed and the cause remanded to the trial court
to award attorney's fees on appeal to the Appellee.
Dated this £

day of mJdtMAtod^

, 2007.
Respectfully submitted,

jeorge K. Fadel
Attorney for Appellee
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